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Commercial Law
INSURANCE
J. Denson Smith*
Although there is early authority in support of the holding
in Kelmell v. Atlas Life Ins. Co.' that a want of insurable interest in a life insurance policy is a defense that must be specially
pleaded, 2 such a view seems open to serious question. The basic
purpose of the requirement that a person who insures the life
of another have an insurable interest in the other's life is to
prevent a particularly vicious practice which became so flagrant in eighteenth century England that the English parliament
enacted the Statute of 14 George III, Chapter 48, in 1774, to
put a stop to such "mischievous kind of gaming." s The present
Louisiana statute is couched in prohibitory terms and rightly so
because this is a matter of grave public policy. 4 In recognition

of these facts the United States Supreme Court has said: "The
defense is allowed, not for the sake of the defendant, but of the
law itself. The principle is indispensable to the purity of its
administration. It will not enforce what it has forbidden, and
denounced. The maxim Ex dolo malo non oritur actio is limited
by no such qualification. The proposition to the contrary strikes
us as hardly worthy of serious refutation. Whenever the illegality appears, whether the evidence comes from one side or the
other, the disclosure is fatal to the case. No consent of the defendant can neutralize its effect. A stipulation in the most sQlemn form to waive the objection, would be tainted with the vice
of the original contract, and void for the same reasons. Wherever the contamination reaches, it destroys. The principle to
be extracted from all the cases is that the law will not lend its
support to a claim founded upon its violation." '5 It has also been
said that the court itself may raise the point sua sponte.6 Consistent with the language of the Supreme Court, although there
are decisions to the contrary, the majority view is that the in*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 113 So.2d 609 (La. 1959).
2 Kennedy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 10 La. Ann. 809 (1855).
3. See WRIGHT AND FOYLES, HISTORY OF LLOYDS 93-94 (1928)..
4;LA. R.S. 22:613A (1950).
5. Hall v. Coppell, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 542, 558-59 (1868).
6. Midland Nat. Bank v. Dakota Life Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 346,, 349 (1928)
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surer cannot be precluded by estoppel or waiver from raising
the defense. Likewise the prevailing view is that the incontestable clause does not preclude the defense of lack of insurable
interest. 7 In the instant case the testimony of the plaintiff who
had procured the policy strongly indicated that he was simply
engaged as a vocational wagerer on the lives of others.8 Granting that a full presentation of evidence on the point might possibly have shown otherwise, it appears that, at least, the case
should have been remanded. In a recent Alabama case judgment was rendered against an insurer who issued a policy on
the life of a child to one who had no insurable interest and who
later murdered the child in an effort to collect on the policy.9
A clearer demonstration of the public interest could hardly be
discovered. Finally the case relied on principally by the court 0
presented only the question of the extent of recovery by a creditor insuring his debtor's life and two of the other cases 1 involved insurance on property where there is really no opportunity to gamble, since recovery should always be limited to the
extent of the insured's interest in the property inasmuch as such
a policy is a policy of indemnification. Finally, the public interest in discouraging arson is hardly equal to that in discouraging
murder.
Louisiana's jurisprudence accords with the rule uniformly
followed that resolves ambiguities in insurance policies against
the insurer. In Toler v. All American Assurance Co.' 2 an ambiguity was found respecting a double indemnity provision in
a policy attached to which was a rider covering the payment of
an additional premium because of the aviation activities of the
insured. However, by applying Article 1949 of the Louisiana
Civil Code the court found an adequate explanation of the meaning of the rider in other policies issued previously to the deceased, including one issued at the same time as the policy in
question. It seems manifest that the decision would have gone
7. See PATTERSON, CASES ON INSURANCE 326 (3d ed. 1955).

8. "Q. How did you get to [be] beneficiary under this policy if you had no
interest in her?"
"A. The insurance agent who sold the policy said it made no difference. If
you will look at the records of the Atlas Insurance Company, I insured other
people, too." 113 So.2d 609, 610 (La. 1959).
9. Liberty National Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon, 267 Ala. 171, 100 So.2d 696
(1957), noted in 19 LOUISIANA LAW RWviEw 555 (1959).
"10. 113 So.2d 609 (La. 1959).
11. Katheman v. General Mutual Ins. Co., 12 La. Ann. 35 (1857) ; Roos v.
Merchants' Mutual Ins. Co., 27 La. Ann. 409 (1875).
12. 237 La. 815, 112 So.2d 623 (1959).
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against the insurer but for the fact that it had issued other
policies to the insured which contained provisions that had the
effect of destroying the existing ambiguity. Insurers issuing
similar policies should take note of this decision and frame the
wording of any endorsement of the kind here involved so as to
make it clear that the death from aviation provision applicable
to:the payment of double indemnity is not waived in return for
the additional premium charged for the life coverage because
of aviation activity.
Under the broadened coverage that has become customary
in automobile liability policies whereby the insured is covered
with respect to his operation of substitute automobiles and with
respect to his operation of automobiles belonging to others, conflicts between insurers are inevitable. In Cameron v. Reserve
Ins. Co. 13 the insured was seeking judgment against his insurer
and the insurer of the person to whom he had loaned his vehicle
to recover for its loss resulting from a collision or upset. Each
insurer claimed that the coverage afforded by its policy was not
operative in consequence of the coverage afforded by the other.
On the basis of a careful interpretation of the pertinent policy
provisions the court concluded that the owner's policy was operative to the exclusion of the policy which extended protection
to the driver. In so doing it reversed the trial court's holding
that the defendant companies were co-insurers. The decision
seems to be in keeping with the apparent underlying purpose
of the "Use of Other Automobiles" clause of the driver's policy.
A congenital malformation in the lower structure of plaintiff's spinal column which resulted in his total and permanent
disability when, in trying to remove a heavy drum full of fuel
oil from a truck the bed broke and plaintiff fell to the ground
with the drum, injuring his back, was held in Thibodeaux'v.
Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co.14 not to constitute a bodily infirm-

ity which contributed to the loss within the "Reductions" clause
of a combination policy. The court found no direct Louisiana
authority in point, but considerable authority in the case law
of other jurisdictions. The holding is in keeping with the view
generally taken concerning the meaning of like provisions.
The case of Roach-Strayhan-HollandPost No. 20, American
Legion Club, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co. 15 involved the question
13. 237 La. 433, 111 So.2d 336 (1959).
14. 237 La. 722, 112 So.2d 423 (1959).
15. 237 La. 973, 112 So.2d 680 (1959).
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of the degree of evidence required to establish a loss by windstorm. The defense was based on the claim that the collapse of
-a roof was due to structural weakness. The court concluded
that the plaintiff had succeeded in showing that the windstorm
was the proximate or efficient cause of the loss, although structural weakness may have been a contributing factor. Perhaps
in most such cases the latter would be true, but as the trial court
remarked, a building can be insured even if it is improperly
constructed. This addresses itself to the matter of inspection
when the taking of the risk is under consideration.

CORPORATIONS
A. N. Yiannopoulos*
In the 1958-1959 term the Louisiana Supreme Court handed
down several decisions involving problems of corporation law,
such as authority of corporate officers, validity of sale of entire
corporate assets, illegal reduction of capital, and taxation of
foreign corporations doing business in Louisiana.
Authority of Corporate Officers
Friedman v. Noel Estate, Inc.,' involved the frequently debated issue of authority vested in the president to bind his corporation in contractual matters. The general rule is that the2
president has very little authority by virtue of his office alone.
Corporate affairs are ordinarily managed by the board of directors and the president is merely the presiding officer of the
board. 8 However, trying to cope with modern business practices,
the courts in several states have held that the president has, at
least prima facie, authority of a general manager to conduct
the ordinary business of the corporation. 4 In other states, where
the strict rule prevails, the courts have held that the president
may bind the corporation by reason of acquiescence of the directors in a known exercise or assumption of power. 5 This result
*Research Associate Professor, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. 236 La. 862, 109 So.2d 447 (1959).
2. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1945-1946 Term Business and Commercial Law, 7 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 165, 257 (1947).
3. See LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 228 (1959).
4. Id. at 228 et seq.
5. See 2 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 509 (1938).

